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BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES V. KELCO DISPOSAL, INC.: THE
EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FOLLOWING A CRESCENDO of law review articles
1 that ar-
gued that the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment 2
was applicable to punitive damages, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc.,3 held that the "Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to
awards of punitive damages in cases between private parties."4 Al-
though this decision foreclosed constraints on punitive damages by
the excessive fines clause, the Court left the door open for a due
process clause challenge to punitive damages.
Prior to 1980, Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) was the sole
provider of roll-off waste collection services6 in the Burlington,
Vermont area. In 1980, Joseph Kelly, a former BFI district man-
ager, founded Kelco Disposal, Inc., in order to compete with BFI
in the Burlington roll-off waste market. By 1982, Kelco had cap-
tured 43 percent of the Burlington market.'
In 1982, BFI reacted to Kelco's success by offering to buy
Kelco and, after that failed, attempting to drive Kelco out of busi-
ness by reducing its prices.8 During the first four months of BFI's
lower rates, Kelco's revenues dropped 30 percent. In response,
Kelco's attorney contacted BFI and threatened legal action to
challenge BFI's pricing strategy. BFI did not react- to the
I. E.g. Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: Application of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 5 COOLEY L. REV. 667 (1988); Jeffries, A Comment on the Con-
stitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986); Massey, The Excessive
Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233
(1987); Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (1987).
2. The eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend.' VIII.
3. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
4. Id. at 2912.
5. Id. at 2921.
6. "Roll-off waste collection is usually performed at large industrial locations and
construction sites with the use of a large truck, a compactor, and a container that is much
larger than the typical 'dumpster.'" Id. at 2912 n.2 (quoting 845 F.2d 404, 406 (2d Cir.
1988)).
7. Id. at 2912.
8. Id.
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threatened legal action and maintained its pricing strategy for sev-
eral more months. By 1985, however, Kelco had captured 56 per-
cent of the market in spite of BFI's actions. As a result, BFI sold
out to a third party and left the Burlington area.9
In 1984, Kelco brought suit against BFI in the United States
District Court in Vermont. Kelco alleged that BFI had attempted
to monopolize the roll-off waste collection market in the Burling-
ton area in violation of the Sherman Act."0 Kelco also claimed
that BFI had interfered with its contractual relations in violation
of Vermont tort law. The case proceeded to a jury trial where BFI
was found liable on both the federal antitrust and the state tort
claims."
At a subsequent trial to determine damages, Kelco argued for
compensatory and punitive damages, appealing to the jury to "de-
liver a message" to BFI.12 The jury returned a verdict of $51,146
in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.
The district court then denied BFI's motions for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, a new trial, and remittitur. The court
"awarded Kelco $153,438 in treble damages and $212,500 in at-
torney's fees and costs on the federal antitrust claim, or, in the
alternative, $6,066,082.74 in compensatory and punitive damages
on the state-law claim."'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,' 4 and the Su-
preme Court of the United States granted certiorari on the puni-
tive damages issue.' 5
I. HISTORY
The eighth amendment received little attention from the First
Congress, and the excessive fines clause itself sparked little de-
bate. "'6 In fact, "[a]lthough the prohibition of excessive fines was





14. 845 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1988). The court of appeals noted that even if the exces-
sive fines clause applied to punitive damages in cases between private parties, the punitive
damages awarded were not "so disproportionate as to be cruel, unusual, or constitutionally
excessive." Id. at 410.
15. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 527 (1988).
16. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2914 (1989);
see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910) (interpreting the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause of the eighth amendment).
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mentioned as part of a complaint that the amendment was unnec-
essary and imprecise . . Congress did not discuss what was
meant by the term "fines," or whether the prohibition had any
application in the civil context."'11
The Supreme Court had recognized, in such cases as Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie"8 and Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
v. Crenshaw,9 that the application of the excessive fines clause to
punitive damages was "a question of some moment and diffi-
culty."20 It was not until Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Dis-
posal, Inc., that the Court squarely addressed the issue and finally
provided an answer.
II. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal Inc.
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Blackmun authored the four-part majority opinion for
the Court. He wrote for a unanimous Court in parts one, three,
and four of the opinion .2 The first part outlined the history of the
case.22 The second part, from which Justices O'Connor and Ste-
vens dissented,23 detailed the Court's reasoning in holding that the
excessive fines clause does not apply to punitive damages in cases
between private parties.24 The next part explained why the Court
did not address the due process challenge to punitive damages.25
The fourth part responded to BFI's arguments that federal com-
mon law served to restrict the punitive damages awarded.28
17. Browning-Ferris Industries, 109 S. Ct. at 2914; see also Weems, 217 U.S. at 369
(discussing the lack of statutory definition for the terms "excessive bail" or excessive
fines").
18. 475 U.S. 813 (1986). This is the first case in which the Supreme Court raised
the issue of whether the excessive fines clause limited punitive damages. The Court did not
decide the issue as the case was decided on other grounds.
19. 486 U.S. 71 (1988). In this case, the Supreme Court once again raised fhe issue
of whether the excessive fines clause limited punitive damages but again decided the case
on other grounds.
20. Id. at 79.
21. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2912 (1989).
Justice Brennan also filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Id. at
2923-24 (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 2912-13.
23. Id. at 2924-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 2913-21.
25. Id. at 2921.
26. Id. at 2921-23.
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1. The Excessive Fines Clause Does Not Limit Punitive
Damages in Cases Between Private Parties
Justice Blackmun began the opinion by noting that even
though prior cases had suggested that the eighth amendment was
addressed to courts exercising criminal jurisdiction only, the Court
did not need to limit the eighth amendment's application to crimi-
nal cases to decide the instant case. Rather, the Court needed only
to decide whether the excessive fines clause was applicable t6
cases between private parties.27 To decide this, the Court felt it
needed only to examine the "purposes and concerns of the
[Eighth] Amendment, as illuminated by its history."2
Blackmun noted that the history of the eighth amendment
yielded no direct evidence of the First Congress' intended meaning
for the excessive fines clause.29 Lacking direct evidence of its
meaning, the Court focused on the meaning of the word "fine" at
the time the amendment was adopted. According to the Court, the
meaning of the word "fine" at that time was "a payment to a
sovereign as punishment for some offense."'30 The Court concluded
from this that fines were assessed in criminal, not civil actions.31
The Court was not content to rely on this inferential evidence
to limit the excessive fines clause's application to criminal actions
but deigned to examine the purpose and history of the Clause.
According to Blackmun, the "undisputed purpose" of the eighth
amendment's adoption was the "particular intent of placing limits
on the powers of the new government" by providing "protection
for persons convicted of crimes." 2 Thus, the Court stated that the
"primary focus of the Eighth Amendment was the potential for
governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial' power, not concern with
the extent or purposes of civil damages. 3 3
To support its reading of the purpose of the eighth amend-
ment, the Court recounted the amendment's historical pedigree.
Because the eighth amendment was based directly on the Virginia
Declaration of Rights which, in turn, was "adopted verbatim"
from the English Bill of Rights (1689), the Court examined the
27. Id. at 2914.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2914-15.






purpose of the English Bill of Rights.3 4 The Court concluded that
the English Bill of Rights was drawn up by men who had been
subjected to heavy fines by the King's Bench and who wished to
limit the sovereign's ability to collect fines. Seeing as the English
definition of fines was identical to the American definition of fines
suggested by the Court earlier, the Court found "clear support for
reading our Excessive Fines Clause as limiting the ability of the
sovereign to use its prosecutorial power, including the power to
collect fines. ' 35 Thus, the Court believed that the history of the
excessive fines clause limited its application only to those fines "di-
rectly imposed by, and payable to, the government."3
The Court's inquiry did not end there. Justice Blackmun
noted that eighth amendment jurisprudence had not been "inflexi-
ble" and that when time brings into existence new conditions and
purposes the amendment "must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth. '3 7 Justice Blackmun con-
cluded that as punitive damages were around when the eighth
amendment was adopted but not specifically included within the
scope of the amendment, to widen the application of the amend-
ment to include punitive damages would be inappropriate. 8 To
include punitive damages within the scope of the amendment
would be to stray "too far afield from the concerns that animate
the Eighth Amendment."3 9
2. A Due Process Challenge to Punitive Damages Was Not
Properly Before the Court
BFI also argued that the due process clause would limit a
jury's discretion to award punitive damages in the absence of any
statutory limitation. Blackmun admitted that some authority ex-
isted to support that proposition but that the Court would not con-
sider the argument in the instant case as it was not raised before
the district court or the court of appeals and BFI made no specific
mention of the due process argument in its petition for
certiorari.40
34. Id. at 2916.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2916.
37. Id. at 2919.
38. Id. at 2919-20.
39. Id. at 2920.
40. Id. at 2921.
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3. Federal Common Law Does Not Compel the Determination
that Punitive Damages Are Excessive
BFI argued that the punitive damages awarded to Kelco were
"excessive as a matter of federal common law." '41 Justice Black-
mun responded that BFI failed to direct the Court to a body of
developed federal law which would support its position.4 2 He also
noted that nothing BFI had presented to the Court had convinced
it to disturb the deference that appellate courts traditionally ac-
cord district courts in deciding whether to order a new trial or
exercise its power of remittitur4
B. The Concurrence
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a separate
concurrence addressing the issue of whether the due process
clause limited punitive damages. The concurring Justices joined
the majority opinion only on the understanding that that the opin-
ion "leaves the door open for a holding that the due process clause
constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases
brought by private parties. 44 The concurrence agreed that the
due process clause issue was not properly before the Court in the
instant case but stated that because "[t]he touchstone of due pro-
cess is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of gov-
ernment," and juries are "left largely to themselves in making this
important, and potentially devastating" award of punitive dam-
ages, due process may very well constrain such awards. 5
C. The Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Jus-
tice Stevens, agreed with the majority that no due process argu-
ment was properly presented by BFI, and that the punitive dam-
ages award could "not be overturned as a matter of federal
common law."' 4 The dissent disagreed, however, with the major-
ity's conclusion that the excessive fines clause did not constrain
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2922-23.
44. Id. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring).
45. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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awards of punitive damages in civil cases.47
1. The Reach of the Excessive Fines Clause
The dissent began by addressing two preliminary issues:
"First, does the Excessive Fines Clause apply to the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?"
and "Second, is a corporation such as BFI protected by the Exces-
sive Fines Clause?" 48
In answering the first question the dissent reasoned that since
the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause ex-
tended to the states as did the amendment's excessive bail clause,
there was no reason to distinguish one clause from another, and,
therefore, the excessive fines clause also applied to the states. 49
In addressing the second question, the dissent concluded that
the excessive fines clause applied to corporations. It reasoned that
as a corporation is protected by the due process clause it should
also be protected by the excessive fines clause.50
Having disposed of the two preliminary issues the dissent
turned to the excessive fines clause itself. The dissent asserted that
the eighth amendment was not limited to criminal cases only. It
pointed out that prior suggestions by the Court that the eighth
amendment was addressed to courts exercising criminal jurisdic-
tion were dictum and that such dictum was inconsistent with, for
instance, the Court's decision that the excessive bail clause of the
eighth amendment applied to civil proceedings. 5  Thus, the
Court's precedents did not foreclose application of the excessive
fines clause to civil cases.
The dissent then proceeded to examine the history and pur-
pose of the eighth amendment's excessive fines clause. It began by
noting that recent scholarship on the issue had been voluminous
and unanimous in conclading that the excessive fines clause-was
applicable to punitive damages in civil suits.52 In short, this and
other scholarship demonstrated that there was evidence to support
the statement that "around the time of the framing and enact-
47. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 2925 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 2926 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. Id. at 2926 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(citing the works
listed in note 1, supra).
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ment of the Eighth Amendment some courts and commentators
believed that the word 'fine' encompassed civil penalties" as well
as criminal penalties.53
Justice O'Connor also noted that the framers of the eighth
amendment failed to explicitly confine the eighth amendment to
criminal proceedings "[a]fter deciding to confine the benefits of
the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to criminal
proceedings." 4 Coupling the evidence regarding the contemporary
.meaning of the word "fine" with the framers' failure to explicitly
confine the eighth amendment to criminal cases, she concluded
that the excessive fines clause was applicable to both civil and
criminal cases.55
The dissent also stated that "[h]istory aside, this Court's
cases leave no doubt that punitive damages serve the same pur-
poses - punishment and deterrence - as the criminal law, and
that excessive punitive damages present precisely the same evil of
exorbitant monetary penalties that the Clause was designed to
prevent. '5
The fact that the degree of punitive damages awarded over
the years had markedly changed disturbed the dissenters. They
stated that as recently as a decade ago the largest award of puni-
tive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a product liabilities
case was $250,000.51 By 1986, awards in excess of $10 million had
been recorded. 58 They further observed that in the instant case,
the award of punitive damages was "117 times the actual dam-
ages suffered by Kelco and far exceeds the highest reported award
of punitive damages affirmed by a Vermont Court. ' 59
In view of all the foregoing, Justice O'Connor held that the
excessive fines clause placed constraints on the award of punitive
damages even in cases between private parties. Having made such
a determination, Justice O'Connor then turned to the issue of
whether the $6 million awarded to Kelco was excessive within the
meaning of the eighth amendment. 60
53. Id. at 2931 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. Id. at 2930 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 2931 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. See id. at 2931-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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2. Was the Amount Awarded Excessive?
The dissent recognized that the determination as to whether a
particular award of punitive damages was excessive or not under
the eighth amendment was not an easy task. But, it offered some
broad guidelines:
First, the reviewing court must accord "substantial deference"
to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the
conduct at issue. Second, the court should examine the gravity
of the defendant's conduct and the harshness of the award of
punitive damages. Third, because punitive damages are penal in
nature, the court should compare the civil and criminal penalties
imposed in the same jurisdiction for different types of conduct,
and the civil and criminal penalties imposed by different juris-
dictions for the same or similar conduct. In identifying the rele-
vant civil penalties, the court should consider not only the
amount of the awards of punitive damages but also statutory
civil sanctions. In identifying the relevant criminal penalties, the
court should consider not only the possible monetary sanctions,
but also any possible prison term.61
Thus, the dissent would have remanded the case to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals so that it could apply the guidelines out-
lined above to determine whether the $6 million punitive damages
award was excessive or not under the excessive fines clause of the
eighth amendment.62
III. ANALYSIS
The majority opinion's refusal to simply rule that the eighth
amendment does not apply exclusively to criminal cases weakened
its argument considerably. Claiming that the eighth amendment
applies only to criminal cases would have been the most compel-
ling argument the majority could have made and the easiest to
defend given the Court's earlier treatment of the eighth amend-
ment.63 The majority probably failed to embrace this approach for
two reasons. First, it is generally thought best to make constitu-
tional decisions on as narrow a basis as possible in order to avoid
unintended results. Second, such a holding would have been incon-
sistent with at least one earlier case which had extended eighth
61. Id. at 2934 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. See generally Id. at 2913-14 (discussing the Court's decisions that limit the
eighth amendment to a criminal context).
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amendment protection to a non-criminal situation64 (a fact
pointed out not by the majority but by the dissent). Whatever the
majority's reasoning, its task was made much more difficult once a
more limited holding was chosen.
Crucial to the soundness of the majority's result was its con-
clusion that the word "fine" did not encompass punitive damages
at the time the eighth amendment was adopted. The majority
maintained that the word "fine" was defined as a payment to the
sovereign for some offense. Unfortunately, in arriving at this defi-
nition, the majority relied on too few sources and did not ade-
quately respond to the scholarship and historical evidence put for-
ward by the dissent which contradicted the narrowness of the
majority's definition.
For example, the majority did not adequately respond to the
dissent's citation of a number of 18th and 19th century dictiona-
ries which did not define "fine" in the majority's narrow terms.
The dictionaries which the dissent pointed to did not mention to
whom the fine was to be paid.6" In the very least, this demon-
strates that the definition of the word "fine" was not nearly as
settled as the majority would have one believe.
In the same vein, the majority did not respond sufficiently to
the evidence which demonstrated that there was some 17th cen-
tury law which provided for the imposition of a "fine" on a civil
plaintiff, and that the fine was not for the use of the sovereign but
for the civil defendant.6 The majority stated that the purpose of
the excessive fines clause was to place limits on the powers of the
new government by providing protections for persons convicted of
crimes. Further, the primary focus of the clause, according to the
majority, was to limit "the potential for governmental abuse of its
'prosecutorial' power."67 This is, however, an artificially narrow
statement of the purpose. The same evidence which supports this
statement of purpose can support the dissent's broader statement
of purpose. The dissent stated that the excessive fines clause "de-
rives from limitations in English law on monetary penalties ex-
acted in civil and criminal cases to punish and deter miscon-
64. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (Excessive Bail Clause applicable to
immigration and deportation); see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987)
(recognizing that Carlson was a civil case).
65. Id. at 2931 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 2915.
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duct."' 8 According to the dissent, the purpose of the clause is to
limit the government's ability to exact monetary penalties from
individuals, whether those penalties are paid to the government or
another party. 9 This statement of purpose is buttressed by the
fact that civil penalties are "not awarded to compensate for in-
jury, but rather to further the aims of the criminal law."7 0
The majority also failed to respond to the dissent's astute ob-
servation that a "governmental entity can abuse its power" in civil
cases just as much as in criminal cases "by allowing civil juries to
impose ruinous punitive damages as a way of furthering the pur-
poses of the criminal law."71
Finally, the majority gave only cursory examination to the
changed circumstances which may have justified the extension of
the excessive fines clause to punitive damages. The majority glibly
noted that as punitive damages were known at the time of the
eighth amendment's adoption, it would be erroneous to suggest
their existence today would be a changed condition justifying a
broadening of the scope of the excessive fines clause.7 2 Such a re-
sponse by the majority ignores the developments in punitive dam-
ages which the dissent stressed at the beginning of its opinion. The
dissent described the "skyrocketing" trend of punitive damages
awards and its deleterious consequence of inhibiting product de-
velopment in such industries as pharmaceutics, automotives, and
aerodynamics. 3 It is quite extraordinary that the majority did not
recognize the explosion of punitive damage awards with its unfor-
tunate consequences as constituting changed circumstances. At
the very least, rather than ignoring this evidence, the majority
should have attempted to minimize it.
The dissent's opinion can be criticized not for its conclusion
that the excessive fines clause applies to punitive damages, but for
the consequential result of that conclusion. The dissent's proposed
guidelines for examining whether an award of punitive damages is
excessive leave a very unpleasant taste in one's mouth. The guide-
lines seem merely to remove the "arbitrariness" of punitive dam-
age awards from the realm of the jury to the realm of the judge.
68. Id. at 2926 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 2932 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. See id. at 2919-20.
73. Id. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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How this will realistically affect "excessive" awards is unclear.
The dissent appears to believe that the gut instincts of the judge
will better avoid excessive awards than the gut instincts of the
jury. Given the guidelines which the dissent draws upon, it would
have been a more convincing opinion if the dissent had concluded
that in the absence of explicit legislative guidance (i.e., punitive
damage caps adopted by the states), punitive damages would be
inherently excessive and, by implication, unlawful. After all, legis-
lative enactments would reflect a societal consensus on the appro-
priateness of a punitive damages award - a consensus which can-
not be obtained when juries or judges make the decision.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated in the analysis, the majority opinion by Jus-
tice Blackmun is flawed in a number of respects which suggests
that the dissent should have prevailed on the merits of the argu-
ments marshaled. Furthermore, the majority opinion is result-ori-
ented whereas the dissent seems to engage in a much more thor-
ough and honest reasoning process.
Finally, it must be noted that it is apparent throughout the
majority, concurrence, and dissent that a due process challenge to
punitive damages would be entertained by the Court. The concur-
rence is even kind enough to outline the argument for those who
would pursue such a course. It is but a matter of time before the
Court deals with this aspect of the constitutionality of punitive
damages.
DONALD S. YARAB
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